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Jeffrey A. Miron
At the end of September 2007, the U.S. economy had experienced
24 consecutive quarters of positive GDP growth, at an average annual
rate of 2.73 percent. The S&P 500 Index stood at roughly 1,500, hav-
ing rebounded over 600 points from its low point in 2003.
Unemploymentwasbelow5percent,andinflationwaslowandstable.
Roughly12monthslater,inSeptember2008,U.S.TreasurySecretary
Henry Paulson announced a major new intervention in the U.S. econo-
my. Under the bailout plan, as explained at the time, the Treasury pro-
posed holding reverse auctions in which it would buy the troubled assets
of domestic financial institutions.1 Further, as the plan developed,
Treasury proposed using taxpayer funds to purchase equity positions in
thecountry’slargestbanks.Thesepoliciesaimedtostabilizefinancialmar-
kets,avoidbankfailures,andpreventacreditfreeze(seePaulson2008).
In the weeks and months after Paulson announced the bailout,
enormous changes occurred in the U.S. economy and in the global
financial system. Stock prices fell sharply, housing prices continued
the decline they had begun in late 2006, and the real economy con-
tracted markedly. The House of Representatives initially voted down
thebailoutbill,butCongressapprovedanexpandedversionlessthan
a week later. The Federal Reserve and other central banks pursued
a range of rescue efforts, including interest rate cuts, expansions of
deposit insurance, and the purchase of equity positions in banks.
Cato Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2009). Copyright © Cato Institute. All rights
reserved.
Jeffrey A. Miron is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics at Harvard
University.
1Iusethetermsfinancialinstitutionandbankinterchangeablytoincludebothbanks
and investment banks. The distinction became irrelevant on September 22, 2008,
when the last major investment banks (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley)
became traditional banking institutions
1
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financial crisis and of the most dramatic aspect of the government’s
response—theTreasurybailoutofWallStreetbanks.Myoverallconclusion
isthat,insteadofbailingoutbanks,U.S.policymakersshouldhaveallowed
the standard process of bankruptcy to operate.
2 This approach would not
have avoided all costs of the crisis, but it would plausibly have moderated
thosecostsrelativetoabailout.Evenmore,thebankruptcyapproachwould
have reduced rather than enhanced the likelihood of future crises. Going
forward, U.S. policymakers should abandon the goal of expanded home-
ownership.Redistribution,ifdesirable,shouldtaketheformofcashtrans-
fersratherthaninterventionsinthemortgagemarket.Evenmore,theU.S.
shouldstopbailingoutprivaterisk-takerstoavoidcreatingmoralhazards.
The article proceeds as follows. First, I characterize the behavior of
the U.S. economy over the past several years. Next, I consider which
governmentpolices,privateactions,andoutsideeventswereresponsi-
ble for the crisis. Finally, I examine the bailout plan that the U.S.
Treasury adopted in response to the crisis.
What Happened?
IbeginbyexaminingtherecentbehavioroftheU.S.economy.
3 Thissets
thestageforinterpretationofboththefinancialcrisisandthebailout.
Figure 1 shows the level of real GDP over the past five years. GDP
increased consistently and strongly until the end of 2006, and then
againduringthemiddleof2007.GDPfellinthefinalquarterof2007,
rose modestly during the first half of 2008, and then declined again in
the third quarter of 2008. Thus, GDP grew on average over the first
three quarters of 2008, but at a rate considerably below the postwar
average (1.05 percent vs. 3.27 percent at an annual rate).
2To simplify the discussion, I use the term bankruptcy to indicate any official reor-
ganization or liquidationprocedure, meaning both those under the bankruptcy code
and those conducted by regulatory bodies such as the FDIC. The former applies to
nonbanks, the latter to banks.
3The data on GDP (GDPC1), industrial production (INDPRO), real retail sales
(RRSFS), employment (USPRIV), residential investment (PRFIC1), the CPI (CPI-
AUCSL), and the federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS) are from the St. Louis Federal
Reserve data bank, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. The Case-Shiller housing
price data are from Standard and Poor’s, www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/
sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_csmahp/0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0.html. The data on
homeownership are from the U.S. Census, www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
hvs/historic/index.html. The data on stock prices are from Shiller (2000), updated at
www.irrationalexuberance.com/.
Cato Journal
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CJ vol 29-1-(3A-pps.):Layout 1  3/18/09  11:03 AM  Page 2Figures2–4presentdataonindustrialproduction,realretailsales,
and employment. For industrial production, growth was robust for
severalyearsbutflattenedinthesecondhalfof2007andturnedneg-
ative by the second quarter of 2008. A similar pattern holds for retail
sales, except that the flattening occurred in the final quarter of 2007
andnegativegrowthbeganinDecember2007.Foremployment,the
flattening also occurred in the final quarter of 2007 and negative
growth began in December 2007.
The overall picture is thus consistent across indicators. A signifi-
cant slowdown in the U.S. economy began in the final quarter of
2007 and accelerated during early 2008. This performance is consis-
tent with the determination by the National Bureau of Economic
Research’s Business Cycle Dating Committee that a recession began
in December 2007 (see www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html).
Figure5showstheCase-ShillerHousingPriceIndex,adjustedfor
inflation, for the period 1987–2008. Housing prices increased enor-
mously over 1997–2005, especially in 2004 and 2005. The increase
was large, roughly 80–90 percent in real terms. From the end of
2005, housing prices declined slowly through early 2007 and then at
anacceleratingpacefromthatpoint.Despitethesedeclines,housing
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figure 1
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figure 3
Real Retail Sales
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve data bank.
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figure 2
Industrial Production Index
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve data bank.
I
n
d
e
x
2
0
0
2
=
1
0
0
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
o
f
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
CJ vol 29-1-(3A-pps.):Layout 1  3/18/09  11:03 AM  Page 45
Bailout or Bankruptcy?
104,000 
106,000 
108,000 
110,000 
112,000 
114,000 
116,000 
118,000 
J
a
n
-
0
4
M
a
r
-
0
4
M
a
y
-
0
4
J
u
l
-
0
4
S
e
p
-
0
4
N
o
v
-
0
4
J
a
n
-
0
5
M
a
r
-
0
5
M
a
y
-
0
5
J
u
l
-
0
5
S
e
p
-
0
5
N
o
v
-
0
5
J
a
n
-
0
6
M
a
r
-
0
6
M
a
y
-
0
6
J
u
l
-
0
6
S
e
p
-
0
6
N
o
v
-
0
6
J
a
n
-
0
7
M
a
r
-
0
7
M
a
y
-
0
7
J
u
l
-
0
7
S
e
p
-
0
7
N
o
v
-
0
7
J
a
n
-
0
8
M
a
r
-
0
8
M
a
y
-
0
8
J
u
l
-
0
8
S
e
p
-
0
8
N
o
v
-
0
8
figure 4
Private-Sector Employment
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve data bank.
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figure 5
Housing Prices (Case-Shiller)
Source: Standard and Poor’s.
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CJ vol 29-1-(3A-pps.):Layout 1  3/18/09  11:03 AM  Page 5still appeared to be overvalued in late 2008 and needed to fall anoth-
er 20–30 percent to reach the pre-2001 level.
Figure 6 shows the U.S. homeownership rate for the past four
decades.Afterfluctuatinginthe63–66percentrangeforaboutthree
decades, homeownership began increasing in the mid 1990s and
climbed to unprecedented values in the subsequent decade.
Beginning in 2005 the rate stabilized and declined slightly, but in
2008 it was still well above the level observed for most of the sample.
Figure 7 displays residential investment in the United States over
the past several decades. Housing construction fluctuated substan-
tially but displayed an overall upward trend through the early 1990s.
From that point the trend accelerated and continued for over a
decade before beginning a marked decline starting in early 2006.
Even after the substantial decline, however, housing investment in
late 2008 was about where one would have predicted based on the
trend line through the mid-1990s.
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figure 6
Homeownership Rate
Source: U.S. Census.
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at a rate above that suggested by historical trends. This boom coincid-
ed with a substantial increase in homeownership. These facts suggest
that the United States overinvested in housing during this period.
Housing prices rose substantially over the same period. The fact that
housing quantity and price increased together suggests that higher
demand for housing was a major determinant of the housing boom.
Figure 8 shows the real value of the S&P 500 stock price index
over the past 150 years. This value soared during the 1990s to a level
above thatimplied by historicalrates of return,andgrowthafter9/11
and the 2001 recession was robust. Even after the large declines in
the fall of 2008, therefore, the market was not obviously below a rea-
sonable estimate of its long-term trend. Standard predictors of stock
prices, such as the price-earnings ratio, tell the same story.
4
Figure 9 shows the effective federal funds rate, a standard meas-
ure of the stance of monetary policy. The low rate from the early
2000s through much of 2004 was plausibly one factor in the housing
4For further examination of this issue, see Cochrane (2008) and Hamilton (2008).
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figure 7
Real Housing Investment
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve data bank.
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figure 9
Effective Federal Funds Rate
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve data bank.
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figure 8
Stock Prices
Source: Shiller (2000) updated at www.irrationalexuberance.com.
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and stock market booms. Inflation was low and stable during this
period, averaging 2–3 percent for the most part, so the real interest
rate was negative. This implies that the demand for stocks and hous-
ing should have expanded, driving up their prices. The substantial
increase in interest rates from mid-2004 through mid-2006 is plausi-
bly one factor that slowed the economy starting in 2007.
5
To summarize, the U.S. economy had overinvested in housing as of
early 2006, and housing and stock prices were high relative to historical
norms. Thus, the economy was misaligned, and a major adjustment—
such as a recession—was plausibly necessary to correct the misalloca-
tion. The subsequent declines in housing and stock prices (along with
theincreaseinoilprices)reducedtheeconomy’s realwealth,providing
one impetus for a slowdown. Monetary policy stimulated during much
of the boom and contracted in advance of the slowdown.
6
What Caused the Economic Events of the Past Five Years?
Policymakers, pundits, and academics have blamed the financial
crisis on various factors, such as excessive risk-taking by the private
sector, inadequate or inappropriate regulation, deficient rating agen-
cies, and so on. My assessment is that all these factors played a role,
but the crucial, underlying problem was misguided federal policies.
7
The first misguided policy was the attempt to increase homeown-
ership, a goal the federal government has pursued for decades. A
(partial) list of policies designed to increase homeownership includes
the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal Home Loan
Banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Community Reinvestment
Act, the deductibility of mortgage interest, the homestead exclusion
in the personal bankruptcy code, the tax-favored treatment of capital
gainsonhousing,theHOPEforHomeownersAct,and,mostrecent-
ly, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (the bailout bill).
8
5An additional cause of low real interest rates may have been a surge in the demand
for U.S. assets (a savings glut) caused by global financial imbalances. See Caballero,
Fahri, and Gourinchas (2008).
6See Mulligan and Threinen (2008) for a more detailed analysis of the role of wealth
effects in the propogation of the financial crisis.
7For analyses similar to that presented here, see Dorn (2008) and Taylor (2009). For
alternative views about the causes of the crisis, see Baily, Litan, and Johnson (2008),
Brunnermeier (2008), and Hall and Woodward (2008).
8See Slivinski (2008) for further discussion of the government role in promoting
homeownership.
9
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Government efforts to increase homeownership are problematic.
Private entrepreneurs have adequate incentives to build and sell
houses, just as individuals and families have adequate incentives to
purchasethem.Thus,governmentinterventiontoexpandhomeown-
ership has no justification from an efficiency perspective and is
instead an indirect method of redistributing income. If government
redistributes by intervening in the mortgage market, however, it cre-
ates the potential for large distortions of private behavior.
TheU.S.government’spro-housingpoliciesdidnothavenoticeable
negative effects for decades. The reason is likely that the interventions
mainly substituted for activities the private sector would have under-
taken anyway, such as providing a secondary market in mortgages.
Over time, however, these mild interventions began to focus on
increased homeownership for low-income households. In the
1990s, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
ramped up pressure on lenders to support affordable housing. In
2003, accounting scandals at Fannie and Freddie allowed key
members of Congress to pressure these institutions into substan-
tial risky mortgage lending.
9 By 2003–04, therefore, federal poli-
cies were generating strong incentives to extend mortgages to
borrowers with poor credit characteristics. Financial institutions
responded and created huge quantities of assets based on risky
mortgage debt.
This expansion of risky credit was especially problematic because
of the second misguided federal policy, the long-standing practice of
bailing out failures from private risk-taking. As documented by
Laeven and Valencia (2008), bailouts have occurred often and wide-
ly, especially in the banking sector. In the context of the recent finan-
cial crisis, a crucial example is the now infamous “Greenspan put,”
the Fed’s practice under Greenspan of lowering interest rates in
response to financial disruptions in the hope that expanded liquidity
wouldpreventormoderateacrashinassetprices.Intheearly2000s,
in particular, the Fed appeared to have made a conscious decision
not to burst the housing bubble and instead to “fix things” if a crash
occurred.
Thebankingsector’shistoryofreceivingbailoutsmeantthatfinan-
cial markets could reasonably have expected the government to
9See Roberts (2008), Leibowitz (2008), Wallison and Calomiris (2008), White
(2008), and Pinto (2008).
10
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cushion any losses from a crash in risky mortgage debt.
10 Since gov-
ernment was also exerting pressure to expand this debt, and since it
was profitable to do so, the financial sector had every reason to play
along.
11 It was inevitable, however, that at some point a crash would
ensue. As explained in Gorton (2007), the expansion of mortgage
credit made sense only so long as housing prices kept increasing, but
this could not last forever. Once housing prices began to decline, the
market had no option but to suffer the unwinding of the positions
built on untenable assumptions about housing prices.
This interpretation of the financial crisis therefore puts primary
blame on federal policy rather than on Wall Street greed, inadequate
regulation, failures of rating agencies, or securitization. These other
forces played important roles, but it is implausible that any or all
would have produced anything like the recent financial crisis had it
not been for the two misguided federal polices.
12 Wall Street greed,
for example, certainly contributed to the situation if, by greed, one
means profit-seeking behavior. Many on Wall Street knew or sus-
pected that their risk exposure was not sustainable, but their posi-
tions were profitable at the time. Further, markets work well when
private actors respond to profit opportunities, unless these reflect
perverse incentives created by government. The way to avoid future
crises, therefore, is for governments to abandon policies that gener-
ate such incentives.
Was the Treasury Bailout Good Policy?
The Treasury’s bailout plan was an attempt to improve bank balance
sheetsandtherebyspurbanklending.Thejustificationofferedwasthat,
as of early September 2008, major banks were facing imminent failure
because their mortgage-backed assets had declined rapidly in value.
10Gerardi et al. (2008) find that analysts in the mortgage market realized that a fall
in housing prices would mean a drastic fall in the value of mortgage assets, but
assigned only a low probability to that outcome. One interpretation is that the ana-
lysts (and their employers) trusted the Greenspan put to keep prices from falling.
11A mandate that banks issue risky debt might not generate significant problems if
the risk is appropriately priced (Stock 2008). When government mandates that
banks issue debt they would not have provided on their own, however, a market-
clearing price might not exist. An implicit government guarantee of this debt, more-
over, virtually ensures the risk will be underpriced.
12See Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) and Calomiris (2008) for a discussion of the
regulatory issues, and Lucchetti and Ng (2007) for a discussion of the role of ratings
agencies.
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this does not justify a bailout. Failure is an essential aspect of capital-
ism. It provides information about good and bad investments, and it
releases resources from bad projects to more productive ones. As
noted earlier, housing prices and housing construction were too high
at the end of 2005. This condition implied a deterioration in bank
balance sheets and a retrenchment in the banking sector, so some
amount of failure was both inevitable and appropriate.
Thus, an economic case for the bailout needed to show that fail-
ure by some banks would harm the economy beyond what was
unavoidable due to the fall in housing prices. The usual argument is
that failure by one bank forces other banks to fail, generating a cred-
it freeze. That outcome is possible, but it does not mean the
Treasury’s bailout plan was the right policy.
To see why, note first that allowing banks to fail does not mean the
government plays no role. Federal deposit insurance would prevent
losses by insured depositors, thus limiting the incentive for bank
runs. Federal courts and regulatory agencies (such as the FDIC)
would supervise bankruptcy proceedings for failed institutions.
Under bankruptcy, moreover, the activities of failing banks do not
necessarily disappear. Some continue during bankruptcy, and some
resume after sale of a failed institution or its assets to a healthier
bank. In other cases, merger in advance of failure avoids bankruptcy
entirely. Private shareholders and bondholders take the losses
required to make these mergers and sales attractive to the acquiring
parties. Taxpayer funds go only to insured depositors (see Fama
2009, Zingales 2008).
Consider, therefore, how bailout compares to bankruptcy from
three perspectives: the impact on the distribution of wealth, the
impact on economic efficiency, and the impact on the length and
depth of the financial crisis.
From a distributional perspective, bailout is unambiguously per-
verse;ittransfersresourcesfromthegeneraltaxpayertowell-offeco-
nomic actors who profited from risky investments. This is not a
criticism of risk-taking; that is appropriate so long as those benefiting
in good times bear the costs in bad times. This is exactly what occurs
under the bankruptcy approach.
From an economic efficiency perspective, bailout is again prob-
lematic. Mere consideration of a bailout distracts attention from the
factthatgovernmentwasthesinglemostimportantcauseofthecrisis.
12
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Relatedly, bailout creates a moral hazard, thereby generating exces-
sive risk-taking in the future. Bailouts often adopt goals that are not
economically sensible, such as propping up housing prices, limiting
mortgage defaults, or preventing the failure of insolvent institutions.
More broadly, a bailout encourages perverse actions by institutions
that are eligible for the money, such as acquiring toxic assets that the
Treasury might buy or taking huge risks with Treasury capital injec-
tions.
The Treasury bailout of 2008 also initiated a government owner-
ship stake in the financial sector. This means that, going forward,
political forces are likely to influence decisionmaking in the exten-
sion of credit and the allocation of capital. Government, for example,
might push banks to aid borrowers with poor credit histories, to sub-
sidize politically connected industries, or to lend in the districts of
powerful legislators. Government pressure is difficult for banks to
resist, since government can threaten to withdraw its ownership
stake or promise further injections whenever it wants to modify bank
behavior. Further, bailing out banks sets a precedent for bailing out
other industries. Thus, the long-run implications of bailout are
unambiguously bad.
Bailout is superior to bankruptcy, therefore, only if allowing
bank failures would cause or exacerbate a credit crunch. Neither
theory nor evidence, however, makes a compelling case for such
an effect. As a theoretical matter, failure by a bank means that it
cannot extend credit, but this means a profit opportunity exists for
someone else. As an empirical matter, it is difficult to establish
whether panics cause credit freezes or underlying adverse shocks
to the economy cause both reduced lending and panics. Ben
Bernanke’s famous paper on the Great Depression (Bernanke
1983) suffers exactly this problem; it shows that bank failures and
output losses are correlated, but it does not pin down the direction
of causation.
This is not to deny that credit freezes occur and cause harm, nor
to assert that credit markets would have been healthy under the
bankruptcy approach. Rather, the claim is that overinvestment in
housing and the excessive level of housing prices that existed in
the United States meant that an unwinding was necessary to make
the economy healthy. This restructuring implied reduced residen-
tial investment, declines in housing prices, plus shrinkage and con-
solidation of the banking sector. All of this would plausibly have
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generated a recession, even without any credit freeze, and the
recession—along with increased awareness of the risks of mort-
gage lending—would have caused lending to contract, again even
without a credit crunch. Thus, it is not obvious how much of the
credit freeze was due to bank failures versus negative shocks to the
underlying fundamentals.
In fact, the bailout might have exacerbated the credit crunch.
The announcement that the Treasury was considering a bailout
likely scared markets by suggesting the economy was worse than
markets recognized (see Macey 2008). Likewise, the announce-
ment may have encouraged a credit freeze because bankers did
not want to realize their losses or sell their institutions to acquir-
ing firms if government was going to get them off the hook. The
bailout introduced uncertainty because no one knew what the
bailout meant: how much, what form, for whom, for how long,
with what restrictions, and so on.
13 The bailout also did little to
make bank balance sheets transparent, yet the market’s inability to
determine who was solvent was plausibly a key reason for the
freeze.Plus,bankscanrespondtocapitalinjectionsbypayingbonus-
es to executives and dividends to shareholders, or by hoarding cash;
nothing guarantees they will lend out capital injections.
14
Thus, the bailout had huge potential for counterproductive impacts
andatbestanuncertainprospectofalleviatingthecreditcrunchorame-
liorating the recession. This means that allowing further failures would
have been a price worth paying. In particular, the process of failure and
bankruptcy would have countered the financial sector’s temptation to
“bank”ongovernmentlargesse,sothebankruptcyapproachwouldhave
createdbetterincentivesgoingforwardforprivatebehaviortowardrisk.
Lessons for the Future
In my assessment, the financial crisis yields two main lessons. The
first is that redistribution to low-income households should be direct
and on budget, not indirect and off-budget, as in subsidized mortgage
credit. The second lesson is that the moral hazards from bailing out
13Higgs (1997) provides suggestive evidence that uncertainty created by policymak-
ers contributed to the length of the Great Depression.
14See Bordo and Schwartz (1998, 2000) for evidence on both the tendency for
bailouts to exacerbate moral hazard and the ability of bailouts to improve economic
performance.
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private risk-taking are substantial, even when these do not always
appear immediately.
Adjusting policy to incorporate the first lesson is relatively easy: it
requires elimination of specific, preexisting policies such as Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration, and so on.
This might be hard politically, but at least the target is well defined.
Adjusting policy to avoid the creation of moral hazard is harder. A
few specific programs, such as the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation, are ripe for elimination from this perspective, but pol-
icymakers have many ways to bail out private risk-taking. Even elim-
ination of agencies like the FDIC and the Federal Reserve—setting
aside whether this makes sense overall—would not prevent a deter-
mined Treasury from bailing out banks. Thus, the only real con-
straint on such flawed government policy is increased recognition of
its long-term costs.
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